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invoke, and who casts the seducer into hell at the 
end of the play. As I pointed out in my article, it is 
only in this context that the ending of the play is 
defensible. Otherwise, we must stand with Camus 
and Dom Juan himself. We must believe that Mo- 
liere has insulted his audience by granting a soulless 
lump of cold stone an arbitrary victory over his 
human hero. This supernatural ending to a drama 
of purely physical action would be a nasty, tawdry 
contradiction of the play's entire momentum. I will 
spare the reader a recapitulation of my entire argu- 
ment in support of my interpretation of the conflict, 
but it seems to me evident that only by admitting 
God as Dom Juan's principal antagonist can one 
make tolerable sense of Moliere's play. 
FRANCIS L. LAWRENCE 
Tulane University 
Wordsworth's Later Style 
To the Editor: 
The three "close readings" described in the March 
1978 Editor's Column were introduced with this 
line from Marianne Moore: "we do not admire 
what we cannot understand." The proposition is, of 
course, as patently false to experience as is Keats's 
at the end of the "Ode on a Grecian Urn." We often 
admire exceedingly what we do not understand, 
precisely because we do not understand it. This is as 
true of literary criticism as of religious revelation 
(the two activities having become strangely similar 
these days), and one of the three "close readings" 
referred to is a significant case in point. I admire 
Geoffrey Hartman's article "Blessing the Torrent: 
On Wordsworth's Later Style" (PMLA, 93 [1978], 
196-204) because, as one of the specialist readers 
noted, it seems to "open perspectives." I am haunted 
by the possibility, however, that my admiration is 
naive and that what I would believe is sublimity of 
thought may be, in part at least, ingenious con- 
fusion. 
It would be unfair not to place the Wordsworth 
article in context. Hartman is quite consciously voy- 
aging on strange seas of hermeneutic thought. His 
professed aim is to "de-normalize" what appears to 
be a reasonably "normal" sonnet by revealing "an 
unapparent meaning"; or, as he puts it in the Preface 
to Beyond Formalism, "to release a hidden or re- 
pressed content." Now a certain latitude must be 
allowed to an enterprise that takes literary criticism 
into the realm not only of philosophy but of psycho- 
analysis as well. We suffer, therefore, the obstruc- 
tive, opaque, and esoteric jargon-"infinitizing," 
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"phantomized," "the topos of the sublime as such, 
of the atopic," "uncovers a traumatological struc- 
ture," "Wordsworth's lucy-feric style . . . appears to 
be the opposite of luciferic." But our hopes of liber- 
ating Hartman's own "hidden" meanings from all 
this are not always fulfilled. Sometimes it takes an 
act of blind faith to believe that such verbal pyro- 
technics signify something more than sound and 
fury. 
And if we do possess that requisite faith (or cre- 
dulity), there are both theoretical and practical 
difficulties to be faced. Whatever else it may involve, 
interpretation cannot escape the fact that it is also 
an act of persuasion that necessarily has to do with 
rules of evidence and argumentation. How well and 
of what does Hartman persuade us? What evidence 
does he present and by what rules does he present 
it? Surely interpretation is not altogether immune 
from the scientific discipline that condemns the 
multiplication of needless, arbitrary, or self-indul- 
gent complexities. Hartman's excursions into "un- 
apparent" meaning frequently overleap the bounds 
of evidence and of common sense. 
His discussion of the verb "possess" in Section vi 
of the article is, I think, a fair and typical example. 
Although both English usage and poetic context 
suggest the contrary, Hartman decides that "we can- 
not be sure that 'possess' is in the indicative." He 
then piles hypothetical assumptions one upon the 
other-"It might be read," "if we understand," 
"may involve"-to arrive at the reading he desires: 
Wordsworth blesses the torrent. Certainly the rules 
of English grammar do not stand in his way: 
"Though this further reading does not harmonize 
grammatically with the line that follows, it may 
hover over it as an inward possibility." There may 
be enlightened readers of Kenneth Burke to whom 
such a statement is meaningful. Not being among 
them, I can only conclude that Hartman is simply 
trying to have his cake and eat it too. Anything, it 
seems, can mean or echo anything (see the discus- 
sion of supposed Miltonic echoes in Section VII), as 
long as we attach enough "may's," "might's," and 
"if's." 
It is not easy to decide whether these extrava- 
gances are personal or methodological. Have Hart- 
man's productive insights into Romantic place- 
names become a compulsive hobbyhorse? Or does 
the article suggest the inherent danger of "Conti- 
nental" modes of criticism? If the critic proposes 
a journey beyond formalism in order to liberate the 
repressed content of a poem, he must somehow per- 
suade us that the subjectivity so liberated transcends 
his own. I doubt that Hartman always succeeds in 
doing this. His entry into the sonnet is by way of his 
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own "discomfort" at its initial apostrophe: "How art 
thou named?" But his attempts to convince us that 
what he feels is what Wordsworth felt or what we, 
too, should feel are terribly strained. Attempts to 
squeeze relevance out of Wordsworth's letter to 
Beaumont in Section ii or to find meaningful ambi- 
guity in the phrase "Rotha, my Spiritual Child" in 
Section v are shallow bits of ingenuity at best. 
But what of the article's putative subject, Words- 
worth's later style? Hartman proposes to elucidate 
the meaning of neoclassical, formulaic rhetoric in 
the sonnet and, by extension, in Wordsworth's later 
work. What do we learn about this subject? We learn 
that Wordsworth may use such rhetoric both to ex- 
press and to "domesticate" his fears concerning the 
power of imagination. This is interesting, but Hart- 
man himself glosses over the fact that such rhetorical 
devices are present in Wordsworth's early poetry as 
well. The article gives no hint concerning the kinds 
of quantitative, objective verbal studies on which dif- 
ferentiations between "early" and "late"-not to 
mention neoclassical and Romantic-styles can rea- 
sonably be made. 
One could multiply instances of assertive, un- 
documented, flamboyant impressionism in the article 
(see, for example, the assertion of "strange resem- 
blance [sic]" between the sonnet's "narrow room" 
and the "narrow chasm" of the Simplon Pass in 
Section III). But there are larger issues at stake. Few 
of us would deny that new-critical formalism has 
seen its day or that critics like Hartman have opened 
up exciting new possibilities. For this, admiration is 
due, even if we happen to feel that some of these 
critics make assumptions about the nature of lan- 
guage that threaten the very existence of literary 
studies. At least there is room for debate, and, as 
Blake says, "Damn braces." The time may have 
come, however, to reaffirm some basic rules of the 
game, things like plain speech wherever possible, 
attention to evidence, and the avoidance of inge- 
nuity for its own sake. More and more the critic 
himself-his consciousness, his subjectivity, his in- 
tentionality-struts center stage wearing the mask 
of poet and poem. Whatever my admiration for the 
latter, and it is real, I still think that I prefer the 
"normalized" William Wordsworth to the "unappar- 
ent" Geoffrey Hartman. 
SPENCER HALL 
Rhode Island College 
Mr. Hartman replies: 
One can reply to a polemical piece; it is harder 
to engage something that despite its faint opening 
praise does not really try to understand the per- 
spective and critical style it attacks. I won't defend 
that style here; but I can suggest that Hall's call for 
law, order, and proper argument has its own ques- 
tionable assumptions that, to my mind, depress lit- 
erary studies today. 
I note first that no counterinterpretation is 
offered. A normal interpretation is assumed-per- 
haps the one I start from in my essay-but that 
has never been articulated. Even a "normal" inter- 
pretation has to be made; it is not a given until it is 
made. How easy and fruitless it is to insist that poets 
have their commonsensical, normal meaning, with- 
out articulating it! Anyone who does try to express 
that meaning would learn, however, that poems of 
stature achieve their so-called normalcy against 
odds, which remain part of the meaning. Interpreta- 
tion, I. A. Richards once said, is always a victory 
against odds. 
There may not even be a single location of mean- 
ing. The interpreter is bound to enter the scene of 
interpretation, either in his own person or in a rep- 
resentative capacity. All meaning is received mean- 
ing. Moreover, the retroactive force of literature on 
literature-and literature for me includes the liter- 
ature of criticism and scholarship-is by now too 
well substantiated to be reduced to subjectivity and 
personalism. 
Hall thinks I am interested in what is "unappar- 
ent" for egotistical reasons. By constructing an un- 
apparent meaning I try to become apparent as 
interpreter. Yet he does not refute the interpretation 
put forward; instead, by his own appeal to the reader 
he claims (1) that I have not followed certain rules 
of the game, so my findings cannot be admitted, and 
(2) that some of my findings (not clearly specified) 
might be worthwhile but that others (specified) are 
"shallow bits of ingenuity." Granted that he did not 
have the space to back his arguments fully, he still 
should have said something about the rules, and 
should not have assumed so magisterially that every 
sane reader shares his understanding of them. 
Concerning the "unapparent" level of meaning, 
I go as carefully as possible from more apparent to 
less apparent, although these distinctions are rela- 
tive. What is less apparent today may be apparent 
enough tomorrow; the obverse movement, from ap- 
parent to unapparent, is also familiar to those who 
appreciate the mutability of language and of mean- 
ing. Has Hall never questioned the appearances? 
"The unsaid part is the best of every discourse" 
(Emerson). 
I return to the issue of rules. What constitutes 
evidence, or the relation of hypothesis to proof, is, 
as everyone knows, much disputed. If, for instance, 
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one does not accept any meaning that is not 
straightforwardly grammatical, then indeed one 
must reject my interpretation of "possess" in line 
13 of Wordsworth's "To the Torrent at Devil's 
Bridge." But if grammatical expression is consid- 
ered as only one rule by which to determine mean- 
ing in poetry, then the situation changes. My subject 
was not Wordsworth's grammar or his poetic inge- 
nuity in that area but his remarkable attitude toward 
the "force" of language. The grammatical point 
about "possess" is subordinated in my essay to 
Wordsworth's concern with naming, cursing, and 
blessing, whose locutionary force may extend (that 
was my suggestion) to such grammatical particulars. 
Hall, I suspect, has a more prudential (he calls it 
"plain speech") understanding of language than I 
have. He combs my essay to show that it is iffy in 
a way that hides assertiveness, that it plays with 
terms, and that it is unquantitative. Though he con- 
siders these as flaws of argumentation, they seem 
to me presumptive matters of style. He is less of a 
logician than an arbiter elegantiarum. But I don't 
want to dispute a particular point: it is the entire 
attitude of the man that is perplexing. What if the 
game of criticism has changed, or the rules of the 
game are being questioned? Even if that were not 
so, do we want critics to be certified by a Normal 
School? 
As to style, it is conceivable that a flexible or 
playful mode of writing-apparently admitted only 
outside of criticism-comes closer to the rules of 
the language game than Hall's sober, scientific, and 
uppity standards. Besides, he knows he is not all that 
objective. "Damn braces," he says, quoting from 
Blake's Proverbs of Hell. He might have remem- 
bered further hellish axioms. For instance: "One 
Law for the Lion and the Ox is Oppression." Or the 
other half of what he quotes: "Bless relaxes." Then 
"Let Hall house of Hall relax, and bless the Torrent 
with the Interpreter." 
He himself violates a rule of the game, as I un- 
derstand it, by an imperfect quotation from Beyond 
Formalism that makes it appear as if I were a vulgar 
demystifier or depth analyst. The preface to my 
book discusses a difference in the concept of literary 
form. I do not simply justify the Continental style 
of criticism but point out, rather, that "it often ne- 
glects literary form and dissolves art into a reflex of 
consciousness, technology, or social process." I go on 
to suggest, however, that "In Anglo-America, re- 
spect for literary form is a priori, but not necessarily 
deeper. A more radical difference between the two 
approaches [Continental and Anglo-American] cen- 
ters on the presumed objectivity of the work of art: 
for us the reader in his selfhood is the problem, and 
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he needs historical, philological, or similar correc- 
tives . . . but for the Continental critic it is the ob- 
jective form of art that seems problematic, and he 
seeks to liberate it, to release a hidden or repressed 
content." Hall leaves out the concluding sentence, 
with which I will conclude again, in the hope, now 
as then, of finding a better understanding in this 
country for an alternative, though by no means 
alien, mode of thinking about art. "Not our sub- 
jectivity is to be feared but our overreaction to it, 
those pseudo-objective criteria which imprison both 
the work and ourselves." 
GEOFFREY HARTMAN 
Yale University 
La Vie de Saint Alexis 
To the Editor: 
To Evelyn Birge Vitz's excellent demonstration 
of the inadequacy of Greimasian narratological anal- 
ysis, in "La Vie de Saint Alexis: Narrative Analysis 
and the Quest for the Sacred Subject" (PMLA, 93 
[1978], 396-408), I should like to add some consid- 
erations on the origin of Greimas' doctrines and to 
suggest a broader-based, more generally valid ap- 
proach. 
Like many other types of linguistic, stylistic, and 
philosophical theory, Greimas' concepts of Subject, 
Object, Beneficiary, and the rest are too narrowly 
based on Indo-European grammatical structure. The 
major clause or "sentence" in modern French, En- 
glish, and other Indo-European languages has one 
element traditionally termed the "subject," one the 
"direct object," and one the "indirect object" (all 
three of them either simple or compound), and vari- 
ous complements indicating helpers, obstacles, and 
the like. This type of linguistic structure is the ob- 
vious source not only of Greimas' analysis but also 
of medieval philosophers' distinctions between the 
signans (nominative, hence "actor" or subject, "that 
which signifies") and the signatum (accusative, 
hence "goal" or direct object, "that which is signi- 
fied") and of Ferdinand de Saussure's correspond- 
ing formulation of the linguistic sign as involving a 
signifiant and a signifie. 
These structural features are far from universal. 
Even Latin sentence structure did not involve the 
obligatory presence of a subject (cf. such impersonal 
verbs as pluit 'it rains,' which, in their literal mean- 
ing, cannot have a subject). Greimasian analysis 
in terms of a single Subject and Object is applicable 
only to tightly knit works such as Racinian tragedies 
(cf. the old parallel between the five acts of Berenice 
and the five-word Tacitean sentence Titus Berenicen 
invitus invitam dimisit). 
